(Image taken from ipprospective.com)
Background
The terms merger and amalgamation have not
been defined in the Companies Act, 1956. Halsbury defines
‘amalgamation’ as “a blending of two or more existing undertakings into one
undertaking, the shareholders of each blending company becoming substantially
the shareholders of the company which is to carry on the blended undertakings.”
Presently, the High Court enjoys powers of
sanctioning amalgamation matters under section 394 of the Companies Act though
it is only a matter of time when this power will be exercised by National
Company Law Tribunal, a forum where Chartered Accountants shall be authorized
to appear, and whose constitutionality has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
For the court to exercise its power to pass the scheme of amalgamation, an
application under Section 391 has to be made by the shareholders of the company
seeking amalgamation, after fulfilling the requisite conditions therein.
Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act regulate 'combinations',
requiring prior notification and approval where such provisions are applicable.
These provisions and the Combination Regulations have come into effect on June
1, 2011. The result is that with the enforcement of the combination provisions
and the notification of the Combination Regulations, all mergers, amalgamations
and/or acquisitions within the thresholds postulated in section 5 of the
Competition Act will require prior approval of the CCI. An enterprise which
meets the threshold is required to give a notice to the CCI regarding the
combination it proposes to enter into., under the Combination Regulations, 2011.
Hence, pursuant to the Combination
Regulations coming into effect, a scheme for amalgamation requires sanction
from the CCI to approve that the scheme does not cause an “appreciable adverse
effect on competition”. Similarly, it would also require sanction from the
court under provisions of the Companies Act.
In this blogpost, I shall discuss whether
there is an overlap in the CCI and High Court’s jurisdictions, and whether the
Court’s sanction of a scheme in spite of the CCI’s lack of approval can be deemed
to be valid. I shall further analyse the repercussions of multi-sectoral
regulations and conclude that, while sectoral regulations lead to greater
efficiency and transparency, there would be significant transaction losses in
the absence of clearly demarcated boundaries of areas of operation.
Analysis of Powers of the National Company
Law Tribunal and the Competition Commission of India
The duty of the CCI is to “prevent
practices having adverse effect on competition, promote and sustain
competition, protect the interests of consumers and ensure freedom of trade
carried on by other participants, in markets in India”. This mandate overlaps
with sector-specific regulators like the Securities Exchange Board of India
(“SEBI”), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”), the Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission (“CERC”), the Insurance Regulatory
Development Authority (“IRDA”), and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory
Board (“PNGRB”). See here for an extensive discussion on the
same.
Undoubtedly, enforcing the legal regime of
competition law through a competition authority creates predictability and
certainty for business entities, and it is inefficient to rely on the
specialized knowledge of various sectoral regulators to enforce competition law
effectively.
(Image taken from
theglobalperspective.com)
Under Section 394, the court has the power
to refuse sanction of a proposed scheme of merger provided the affairs of the
company have been conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of its
members or to ‘public interest’. While shareholders’ interests do not pose a
problem with respect to competition law, the term ‘public interest’ is of wide
connotation. Arguably, public interest could encompass competition policies,
which when flouted lead to adverse results for a wide gamut of consumers.
What Constitutes ‘Public Interest’:
Jurisdictional Overlaps
Thus, we need to look into the meaning of
the term “public interest” to determine whether the Tribunal would also have
the power to look into the anti-competitive aspect of mergers. It has been held
by the court that ‘public interest’ would permit the court to look into why the
transferor company came into existence, for what purposes it was set up, and
other analogous conditions leading up to why the company seeks to be dissolved
by merging into another company (In Re: Wood Polymer Limited (1977) 47 Comp Cas
597).
In this analysis, it would be imperative
to recall Section 23 of the now repealed Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Act. Section 23 explicitly stated that no merger shall be sanctioned
by any Court unless the scheme has received prior approval under the Section
from the Central Government. Even prior to the repeal of the Act, this
particular section was deleted by the legislature. Hence, post-deletion, the
situation under the MRPTPA would have been similar to what it is today under
the Competition Act which does not lay down any express prior approval clause
for mergers, even though the Combination regulations, mandate that without such
approval, the scheme would not be passed. The analogous position under the
MRTPA came up for consideration in Hindustan Lever Employees Union v Hindustan
Lever Limited & ors (1995) 83 CompLJ 30(SC), where it was contended that a
conjoint readings of the other provisions of the Act render it necessary to
have prior sanction of the Central Government or MRTP Commission before a
Scheme of Amalgamation or merger can be sanctioned. But the court rejected this
argument by holding that if this were to be accepted, it has to be held that
the provisions of Section 23 were wholly unnecessary and otiose, because even
otherwise sanction or clearance of the Central Government was a condition
precedent for effecting a scheme of amalgamation or merger. Thus the Court
upheld the right of the Company Court to sanction a scheme of amalgamation
without prior approval from the Commission under the MRTPA or the Central
Government. It also held that a company may, on its own, grow up to capture a
large share of the market. But unless it is shown there is some illegality or fraud
involved in the scheme, the Court cannot decline to sanction a scheme of
amalgamation.
Conclusion
Thus what is material in the present
controversy is that the Court, while exercising its powers under Section 391
and 394 of the Act would not need to wait for prior approval of the Competition
Commission. Another issue of significance is whether even if a proposed
amalgamation is sanctioned by the Court (or Tribunal), the same would be
subject to the final decision of the Commission. The above-mentioned judgment
seems to indicate this in the affirmative when it held that if it is found that
the working of the Company is being conducted in a way which brings it within
the mischief of the (now repealed) Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices
Act, it would be open to the authority under the Monopolies & Restrictive
Trade Practices Act to go into it and decide the controversy as it thinks fit.
Having thus delineated the functions of
the Commission and the Court/Tribunal, it is essential however to remember the
legislature’s prerogative to enact law that is “certain, clear and predictable”
(Fuller’s Morality of Law). Thus while the legislature, in its wisdom, has
enacted the Competition Act and the Combination Regulations leaving the issue
of the power of the Court/Tribunal to sanction a scheme under the Companies Act
open, this leaves ambiguities and doubts with regards to the powers of the
respective enforcement authorities which should be clarified by the
legislature.
With that, let the competition
begin…!
(Image taken from gapnap.com)
[This post has been authored by Sreerupa
Chowdhury, B.A./B.Sc. LL.B., 4th Year, The W.B. National University of
Juridicial Sciences]
Good attempt! But one look at Section 390 of the Companies Act clears the confusion:
ReplyDelete390. Interpretation of sections 391 and 393. In sections 391 and 393,-
(a) the expression" company" means any company liable to be wound up under this Act;...."
It is self-exlanatory that the "Company" here shall be a company liable to be wound up at law. The jurisidiction of the Court (or NCLT) would be excercisable only in sitautions where the company is in distres and there is a need to re-organise it. Therefore, there would not be any jurisdictional conflict between CCI and Court (or NCLT).
I'm afraid the above comment does not seem to reflect the proper state of law. A company liable to be wound up under the 1956 Act does not mean a company that is in distress. Certain companies cannot be wound up under the Companies Act irrespective of the state of distress they may be in and they have been kept out of the purview of S. 390 that way - a simple case of statutory drafting interpretation. As per the current position, even if two perfectly healthy companies seek restructuring, those sections will apply to them.
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